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That German trade unionism is in decline seems to be beyond dispute. More controversial is the implied 
change in union impact on worker wages. A linked employer-employee dataset is deployed over an 
interval of continuing decline in unionism to address this issue. Over the sample period 2000-2010 it is 
found that joining a sectoral agreement always produces higher wages, while exiting one no longer leads 
to wage losses if the transition is to a firm agreement. Leaving a firm agreement to non-coverage also 
leads to wage reductions, while joining one from non-coverage appears decreasingly favorable. The one 
constant is the persistence of a small positive union wage gap. 
 
  
 
1. Introduction 
Most information on the union-nonunion differential in Germany – strictly, the wage gap 
between covered and uncovered workers – pertains to the 1990s or early 2000s. Yet, as is 
widely known, German unions have been in retreat both during and subsequent to these 
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intervals. It is the very breadth of this decline that makes investigation of the more recent 
interval more compelling.  
First, union density has fallen sharply. The decline can be dated from the mid-1980s, the 
sudden rise in membership after 1989 proving to be little more than a diversion. Union density 
declined from 36 percent in 1991, in the aftermath of unification, to 19.3 percent in 2009 (see 
Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2007; Bispinck, Dribbusch, and Schulten, 2010; Fitzenberger, 
Kohn, and Wang, 2013).1 Second, overall collective bargaining coverage as a share of 
employment fell in western Germany (eastern Germany) from 70 (55) percent in 2000 to 65 
(51) percent in 2009 (see Bispinck, Dribbusch, and Schulten, 2010). The corollary was a 
continuing rise in the bargaining free sector. Third, the decline in collective bargaining coverage 
was not deflected by a growth in orientation in the uncovered sector, nor was it to receive any 
support from the extension principle.  
Orientation refers to a process whereby uncovered firms claim to shadow the terms of 
sectoral agreements. The coverage of orienting firms in the private sector rose from 17.9 
percent of employment in 2000 to 22.4 percent in 2010. This rising trend only partially 
compensated for the decline in sectoral bargaining, since the share of employees covered by 
sectoral agreements fell from 59.9 to 49.3 percent over the same interval. Moreover, these are 
simple frequencies. The wages paid by orienting firms have been shown to lie well below those 
set under collective bargaining (see Addison et al., 2014). As far as the extension of collective 
agreements to employees and employers not bound by the relevant sectoral agreement is 
                                                          
1
 Interestingly, Hirsch and Schnabel’s (2011) measure of union bargaining power, based on a right-to-manage model 
of collective bargaining, suggests that the fall off in union strength occurred mostly after 1999, remaining fairly 
stable in the 1990s despite a fairly uniform drop in density over the entire period. 
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concerned this, too, has evinced pronounced decline. For example, considering just the 
extension of primary collective agreements under the 1949 Collective Agreement Act, their 
number fell from 408 (or 5.4 percent of all such agreements) to just 245 (1.5 percent) in 2009 
(Bispinck, Dribbusch, and Schulten, 2010).  
Finally, German sectoral collective bargaining has been buffeted by decentralizing 
tendencies, as manifested in opening clauses and in-plant alliances or pacts for employment 
and competitiveness (see, for example, Bispinck, 2004; Seifert and Massa-Wirth, 2005). These 
extensive contractual innovations have allowed firms to deviate from sectorally-agreed 
provisions (see, inter al., Haipeter and Lehndorff, 2009). Their deployment has occasioned a 
considerable debate in the industrial relations literature, initially between those emphasizing 
change (erosion, disorganization, liberalization, and neoliberalism) and those emphasizing 
continuity (path dependence, hybridization, and varieties of capitalism) and, latterly, between 
those who discern stability in a shrinking core and those who see the decline in coverage as 
corrosive of the system as a whole (see, respectively, Hassel, 1999, 2014; Streeck, 2010).2 
The very scale of these changes in Europe’s largest economy makes Germany an 
interesting case for consideration. The focus of the present article upon the union wage gap is 
justified because of the sparse nature of research into the union premium, disagreement as to 
its magnitude and, to repeat, lack of information on its development.3 Against this backdrop, 
the present exercise which seeks to obtain estimates of the course of the union wage gap at a 
                                                          
2
 Economists have generally eschewed formal analysis of the decline in coverage – exceptions include Addison et al. 
(2011) and Fitzenberger and Sommerfeld (2014) – although a popular view is that collective bargaining decline has 
its counterpart in massively improved economic competitiveness (e.g. Dustmann et al., 2014). 
3
 The key articles in the literature are Stephan and Gerlach (2005), Antoncyzk (2010), Gürtzgen (2012), and 
Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Lembcke (2013). 
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time of unambiguously declining union authority while controlling for unobserved firm and 
worker heterogeneity gains additional purchase.  
The unique dataset used in this inquiry is the cross sectional version of the linked 
employer-employee data supported by the German Institute for Employment Research. The 
analysis is based on two (three-year) clouds of data at each end of the sample period 2000-
2010, exploiting changes in establishment collective bargaining status over time. Estimates of 
union wage effects are obtained by comparing the wage growth of workers employed by plants 
joining or leaving collective bargaining with that of workers employed by establishments that 
did not change their collective bargaining status – designated as never members and always 
members, respectively, which counterfactuals are then reversed for robustness checks. 
 It is reported that joining a sectoral agreement always yields higher wages, while 
leaving one no longer produces wage losses if the transition is to a firm agreement. Leaving a 
firm agreement to non-coverage also leads to wage reductions, while joining one from non-
coverage seems decreasingly favorable. The reverse counterfactuals in turn yield 
correspondingly smaller estimates (in absolute value) of wage development than reported for 
the initial counterfactuals. 
 
2. The Dataset 
The study uses the LIAB Cross-Sectional Model Version 2 1993-2010 (LIAB QM2 9310) of the 
linked employer-employee data supported by the Institute for Employment Research/Institut 
für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB). The LIAB data are created at the Research Data 
Center (Forschungsdatenzentrum, or FDZ) of the Federal Employment Agency/Bundesagentur 
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für Arbeit by linking the establishment data from the annual waves of the IAB Establishment 
Panel (Betriebspanel) with information on individuals from the social security records of the 
German Federal Employment Agency.  
The IAB Establishment Panel is a large-scale annual establishment survey that covers up 
to 16,000 establishments every year, beginning in 1993 in West Germany and extended in 1996 
to the former East Germany. The participating establishments are surveyed on a large number 
of employment policy-related subjects. These include employment development, business 
policy and business development, collective bargaining, personnel structure and recruitment, 
remuneration, and working time. The survey is unique in Germany, since it is representative for 
all industries and establishment sizes nationwide and was conceived from the outset as a 
longitudinal survey.  
The information on individual workers in the LIAB dataset comes from the social security 
records of the German Federal Employment Agency and covers all employees of the 
establishments surveyed in the IAB Establishment Panel. Specifically, it includes employees who 
are subject to social security and also those who are marginally part-time employed 
(geringfügig beschäftigt). For these employees, several demographic characteristics such as 
gender, age, nationality, level of education, occupational group, employment status and place 
of residence are provided. Furthermore, the data contain the individual daily wage of an 
employee. The latter is measured with high accuracy by the authorities since this wage 
information is decisive in calculating an individual’s social security payments. 
In sum, the LIAB dataset is a unique data source for analysing both the supply side and 
the demand side the German labor market along various dimensions. Due to its coverage, it is 
6 
 
also one of the best-suited datasets for investigating the effects of collective bargaining 
coverage on the wages of individual workers in Germany. Several versions of the LIAB data 
including cross-sectional and longitudinal subsamples can be accessed for scientific purposes at 
the FDZ in Nuremberg. 
Several modifications were made to adapt the data to research needs. First, in order to 
improve the quality of the linkage between the survey data and the administrative data, the 
procedure followed by the FDZ in some longitudinal versions of the LIAB for erasing 
observations that exhibit bad linkage quality was followed. A link is defined as having a bad 
quality if the number of employees and apprentices that an establishment has reported in the 
IAB Establishment Panel deviates significantly from the number of employees and apprentices 
that is calculated from the administrative data. (For information on this procedure, see 
Jacobebbinghaus, 2008: 53ff.)  
Second, other modifications concern the key wage variable. In the LIAB data, the 
reported individual wage of a worker is the gross daily wage. Since there exists an upper 
contribution limit in the German social security system, the gross daily wages are top-coded, 
affecting 15 (10) percent of the observations for western (eastern) Germany in the dataset. 
Wages above the contribution limit were imputed, using the procedure suggested by Gartner 
(2005). This involved first estimating a Tobit regression of log daily wages on individual and 
establishment characteristics separately for both parts of the country and for each single year, 
next constructing a truncated normal distribution by using the predicted values from the Tobit 
estimation as moments and by setting the lower truncation point equal to the contribution 
limit, and finally by replacing censored wage observations by values randomly drawn from this 
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truncated normal distribution. For their part, wages were deflated using the Consumer Price 
Index for 2000.  
Third, because only a very broad measure of individual working hours is contained in the 
dataset – in particular, for part-time workers, whether working hours are less or greater than 
18 per week – the analysis was restricted to full-time employed workers who are subject to 
social security. We further excluded those full-time workers who were recorded as receiving an 
implausibly low daily wage (of less than €16). In addition, we excluded observations from the 
following sectors/enterprises: agriculture, hunting, fishing and forestry, public administration, 
and not-for-profit entities. 
Note that use of the cross-sectional version of the LIAB precludes tracking a worker if 
he/she leaves one establishment for another that is not covered by the IAB Establishment 
Survey, or if he/she exits to non-employment. The same problem arises if a worker remains in 
an establishment that subsequently, and for whatever reason, no longer participates in the IAB 
Establishment Survey. Unfortunately, there is no way of circumventing this limitation of the 
data. Making use of one of the available longitudinal versions of the LIAB, or constructing an 
‘LIAB-variant,’ would not suffice as the key information on the collective bargaining status of an 
establishment in a given year will not be available if the establishment fails to participate in the 
IAB Establishment Survey for that year.4 
 
3. Preliminary Data Analysis 
                                                          
4
 For further information on the IAB Establishment Survey and the LIAB, see, respectively, Fischer et al. (2009) and 
Henning, Scholz, and Seth (2013). 
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The analysis of this article is based on two (three-year) clouds of data – annual observations for 
2000-2002 and 2008-2010 – rather than the full 2000-2010 panel. If the entire sample period 
were used to calculate one- and especially two-year changes in status, etc., this procedure 
would over-emphasize the role of permanent establishments in the panel. The more selective 
approach followed here avoids results being based on workers who belong mainly to the large 
establishments that dominate the permanent panel. Further, this approach has the advantage 
of contrasting two distinct periods occurring at the beginning and at the end of the first decade 
of the present century, marked by a distinct decline in collective bargaining coverage and in 
union density. 
 Table 1 presents the main longitudinal features of each subset of observations. Three 
main observations are in order. First, each subperiod contains approximately the same number 
of workers: 2.4 million in 2000-2002 and 1.9 million in 2008-2010. Second, the share of 
individuals appearing in each and every year of each cloud is roughly the same: 29.9 percent in 
the first interval, 32.9 percent in the second. Finally, the percentage of individuals who are 
observed at least twice over the two intervals is also approximately constant at 50.9 and 55.8 
percent of the total, respectively. The two clouds of data are therefore comparable in terms of 
the number of workers being observed and their longitudinal profile.  
(Tables 1 and 2 near here) 
The longitudinal pattern of individuals observed at least twice in each observation 
period is considered in Table 2. The issue is whether workers stay in the same establishment or 
switch employers. Clearly, in either case – workers who are observed in three consecutive years 
or just two years (consecutively or otherwise) – job stayers massively dominate in each sub-
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period. Accordingly, identification of the union wage effect in the LIAB data has to be based on 
the wage development of job stayers, in conjunction with observed changes in establishment 
collective bargaining status (see also section 4).  
The frequency with which establishments switch their collective agreement status is 
indicated in Table 3. Both one-year and two-year transitions are reported. Switching is 
identified here by changing responses to the question in the IAB Establishment Panel inquiring 
of the firm respondent whether the establishment is covered by a collective agreement.5  In the 
interests of economy, the table now aggregates firm and sectoral agreements into the single 
category of ‘any type of collective agreement.’ (A table containing transitions for the two 
separate collective bargaining arrangements is available from the authors upon request.)  
(Table 3 near here) 
Between 2000 and 2001, for example, it can be seen that 424 out of 3,639 
establishments (or 11.7 percent) abandoned collective bargaining of either type while 441 out 
of 2,792 establishments (15.8 percent) joined a collective agreement from an initial state of no 
coverage. Over this interval, therefore, the percentage of collective bargaining switchers in the 
total number of possible cases is 13.5 percent (=[(424+441)/6,431]*100). So, a considerable 
share of establishments change their collective bargaining status, made up of roughly equal 
numbers of joiners and leavers. Approximately the same percentage of collective bargaining 
switchers is observed in 2001-2002, at 12.8 percent. For the years 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, 
                                                          
5
 There is some inevitable imprecision with respect to leavers – although not joiners – because under German law 
(the Nachwirkungsfrist doctrine) those leaving a (active) collective agreement are supposed to follow its terms for 
incumbent (but not new) employees until a new agreement has been reached at firm level or as a result of individual 
bargaining. It is assumed here that that the longer the firm respondent claims to be no longer covered by a collective 
agreement, the longer the establishment has left a collective agreement and the further adrift of current contracts are 
its wages. 
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the percentage of switchers is 11.5 and 6.8 percent, respectively. Two-year transitions are 
slightly higher than the one-year transitions, at 14.6 and 10.6 percent in the first and second 
sub-periods, respectively.6 
Estimates of the collective bargaining wage gap were obtained by fitting an augmented 
Mincerian earnings function to the separate cross-sections of data. Specifically, the wage gap 
was conditioned on 24 (67) worker- (establishment-) level covariates. The former included 
gender, age (and its square), years of service (and its square), citizenship status, education (6 
levels), and occupation (12 levels).  The latter comprised dummies for location, establishment 
age, the profit situation, the state of technology, works council status, firm size (and its square), 
and industry (40 2-digit), together with the share of female, fixed-term, foreign and skilled 
workers, and employee median age.  
(Table 4 near here) 
Summary regression results are provided in Table 4. The material in the first column 
indicates a positive wage gap of 7 to 14 percent in favor of workers covered by sectoral 
agreements, relative to the comparison group of workers in non-covered establishments. This is 
a sizeable wage gap, consistent with some earlier OLS studies. Note the seeming upward trend 
of this wage gap. The evidence on sectoral versus firm-level agreements in the second column 
of the table points to a wage gap favorable to the former, of some 1.8 to 4.0 percent. The 
results in the final column point unequivocally to higher earnings under any form of collective 
                                                          
6
 Two-year transition rates would be substantially higher were the two samples the same. They are not because two-
year transitions require establishments to be in the sample for three consecutive years, meaning that the sample will 
contain a materially higher proportion of permanent panel stayers. 
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bargaining than under individual bargaining, the margin amounting to some 6.3 to 12.5 
percent. 
 
4. Estimation strategy 
Assume that the (log) gross daily wage for individual i in period t, 𝑦𝑖𝑡,  is given by: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛿𝑈𝑗𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜓𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,                   (1) 
where 𝜃𝑖  and 𝜓𝑗 denote worker- and firm-specific time-invariant effects, respectively; 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a 
vector of observed time-varying and time-invariant worker- and firm-level characteristics, as 
noted in section 3; 𝜆𝑡 is a time dummy; 𝑈𝑗𝑡 is a dichotomous variable indicating the collective 
agreement status of firm j (so that 𝛿 denotes the collective bargaining wage premium); and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
is the error term of the model. As is conventional, further that assume 𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝑈𝑗𝑡, 𝜃𝑖 , 𝜓𝑗) =
0.7 
Given that each observation window (i.e. 2000-2002 and 2008-2010) comprises a 3-year 
interval, one possible route controlling for worker and firm heterogeneity is to take a 2-year 
difference from model (1), to obtain: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 = (𝑍𝑖𝑡 − 𝑍𝑖𝑡−2)𝛽 + 𝛿(𝑈𝑗𝑡 − 𝑈𝑗𝑡−2) + (𝜆𝑡 − 𝜆𝑖𝑡−2) + (𝜓𝑗𝑡 − 𝜓𝑗𝑡−2) + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡−2).           (2) 
Clearly, in following this approach the aim is to capture some medium-term effect of 
collective bargaining coverage. Thus, using the sample of job stayers, for whom by construction 
(𝜓𝑗𝑡 − 𝜓𝑗𝑡−2) = 0, model (2) yields: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 = (𝑍𝑖𝑡 − 𝑍𝑖𝑡−2)𝛽 + 𝛿(𝑈𝑗𝑡 − 𝑈𝑗𝑡−2) + (𝜆𝑡 − 𝜆𝑖𝑡−2) + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡−2).                  (3) 
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 Note that applying OLS to model (1), as was done in Table 3 in a purely cross-section fashion, is equivalent to 
assuming away worker and firm unobserved heterogeneity – or, alternatively, that 𝜔𝑖𝑡  is not correlated with 𝑈𝑗𝑡, 
where 𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜓𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
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In other words, given that individuals stay in the same firm, identification of 𝛿 is achieved via 
workers whose establishments have changed their status from t-2 to t. 
For movers, on the other hand, in general (𝜓𝑗𝑡 − 𝜓𝑗𝑡−2) ≠ 0. This means that under the 
assumption that (𝜓𝑗𝑡 − 𝜓𝑗𝑡−2) + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡−2) is uncorrelated with (𝑈𝑗𝑡 − 𝑈𝑗𝑡−2), an OLS 
regression of model (2) will give an alternative estimate of the effect of collective bargaining 
coverage. Identification of 𝛿 in this case is via job movers whose establishments in t-2 and t 
have the same coverage status vis-à-vis job movers whose establishments have changed their 
status. Unfortunately, as was described in section 2, the number of job movers is too small to 
pursue this approach.  The empirical strategy will therefore perforce rely solely on job stayers.8 
Not wishing to impose symmetry on the effects of an establishment leaving/joining a 
collective agreement, implementation of a difference-in-differences approach is carried out by 
running the selected models across separate subsamples of establishments. These comprise 
collective bargaining leavers and always members on the one hand, and collective bargaining 
joiners and never members on the other. 
Implementing a 2-year difference strategy for the two groups of leavers and always 
members, on the one hand, and joiners and never members on the other, and then regressing 
the changes in the wage outcome indicator on the corresponding change in collective 
bargaining status implicitly assumes that any macro shock, proxied by a time dummy, has a 
                                                          
8
 It would also be possible to use the raw annual data and run the spell fixed-effects version of model (1). In this 
case, by first-differencing within each spell (only consecutive observations on job stayers are useable for 
estimation), we have ∆𝜃𝑖 = 0 and ∆𝜓𝑗 = 0, and therefore model (1) becomes ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∆𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛿∆𝑈𝑗𝑡 + ∆𝜆𝑡 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where ∆ denotes the first difference operator.  Results of a spell fixed-effects model are available from the authors 
upon request. Note further that computing 3- and 4-year differences, for example, would lead to a substantial 
reduction in the number of workers (as the number of establishments with four and five consecutive observations is 
much smaller than the number of establishments with two) as well as a sharply increasing proportion of large 
establishments in the total number of establishments with available data.  
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similar impact on both treated and control groups (e.g. leavers and always members, 
respectively) or that the macro shock does not have any differentiated impact on the decision 
to leave/stay covered by a collective agreement in this particular case. 
Dropping either assumption entails proceeding beyond the ‘unadjusted’ difference-in-
differences estimator, which is likely to rely upon even stronger assumptions. No attempt, then, 
will be made here to correct for the possibility that the macro effect is distinct over the treated 
and control groups. That said, an attempt will be made to check the robustness of the results 
reported here, using alternative control groups. Note that even if treated and untreated groups 
appear to have distinct observable characteristics, it does not necessarily follow that they will 
respond differently to a given shock; or, conversely, that a common set of characteristics will 
generate an identical propensity to change collective bargaining status.  
 
5. Two-Year Differences 
Wage formation is next placed in a longitudinal context, allowing for unobserved establishment 
and worker heterogeneity. Estimates of the collective bargaining premium in the two-year 
difference formulation, using the subset of job stayers, are presented in Table 5. Establishments 
are grouped into separate samples of sectoral and firm-level agreement leavers and joiners and 
their corresponding comparison groups of sectoral and firm agreement stayers (i.e. always 
members and never members), as indicated in the first four columns of the table. The table 
thus gives the 2-year effect of collective bargaining – either sectoral or firm-level agreements – 
on those individuals who do not switch jobs between t-2 and t but who happen to be in 
establishments whose status has changed versus individuals whose establishments do not 
14 
 
switch status. To repeat, identification of the union/collective bargaining effect is obtained via 
changes in an establishment’s collective agreement status, given that workers stay in the same 
establishment over the selected interval. 
(Table 5 near here) 
As can be seen from the table, workers whose establishments leave a sectoral 
agreement for no coverage have their wages reduced by 0.7 percent over the 2000-2002 
interval, compared with those whose establishments remain covered by a sectoral agreement. 
The corresponding effect for the 2008-2010 period is -0.4 percent. If, in turn, a firm leaves a 
sectoral agreement and becomes covered by a firm agreement, the effect is less pronounced in 
the first sub-period, at -0.4 percent, and eventually reversed in the second sub-period, at +0.8 
percent. 
The evidence from workers whose establishments have joined sectoral agreements is 
stronger than that found for sectoral agreement leavers, at +0.7 and +1.1 percent in 2000-2002 
and 2008-2010, respectively, in the scenario where the initial state is of no coverage by any 
type of collective agreement. These gains are even larger if the transition is from firm-
agreement coverage, at +1.0 and +2.3 percent, respectively. Note that the latter result seems to 
contradict the evidence found for sectoral agreement leavers in the second row, last column, in 
the sense that from the perspective of worker wages it looks equally possible to have higher 
wages either from switching from sectoral to firm agreements or the other way around. Our 
preferred explanation for this apparent contradiction is that two sets of estimates might not be 
extracted from strictly comparable samples (see below).  
15 
 
The remaining four rows of the table examine the transitions between any type of 
coverage and firm agreements, on the one hand, and between any type of collective bargaining 
coverage and no coverage at all, on the other. Thus, in the fifth row, there is a reduction in 
wages for those workers whose establishments left a firm agreement to become ‘uncovered,’ 
at -0.9 and -0.7 percent in the two selected intervals, respectively; while joining a firm 
agreement from no coverage, in the sixth row, is increasingly less favorable to worker wages, at 
2.4 percent in 2000-2002, and 0.2 percent (and statistically insignificant) in 2008-2010. Again, 
the wage effects – extracted from switchers into firm agreements from the non-coverage 
regime and vice-versa – are asymmetric. This lack of symmetry returns us to the point that our 
approach is quasi-experimental in nature and not a truly experimental exercise. 
 The last two rows offer perhaps more clear-cut results. Here the comparison is between 
a situation of no coverage with any type of collective bargaining coverage. The evidence 
strongly points to a negative effect on wages of leaving a sectoral or firm agreement and a 
positive effect of joining any type of collective agreement. The respective losses and gains 
average -0.6 and +1.1 percent, and with a clear decreasing tendency in both transitions. Again, 
there is no sign of a close symmetry in the effects of leaving and joining, but there is 
nevertheless a strong indication that it is better for workers to be associated with covered than 
non-covered establishments. 
[Table 6 near here] 
Table 6 further exploits the possibility raised in Table 5 that the analysis is not fully 
controlling for unobserved establishment heterogeneity. The presumption here is that a 
sectoral agreement joiner, say, may more closely resemble a sectoral agreement stayer than a 
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sectoral agreement ‘never member.’ Table 6 thus compares, for the same sample, sectoral 
agreement joiners with sectoral agreement stayers. Although one may question this new 
approach – since it seems eminently reasonable to suppose that a sectoral agreement joiner 
and a sectoral agreement never member share the same beginning-period collective agreement 
status for non-arbitrary reasons – the strategy is worthwhile pursuing as a form of robustness 
check on the previous findings. Table 6 thus changes the counterfactuals not only for sectoral 
agreement changers but for all other coverage transitions as well. 
And indeed the results are quite striking. Thus, even if it is accepted from Table 5 that 
leaving a sectoral agreement has a negative impact on worker wages (taking therefore as a 
comparison group the subset of always covered), it can be seen from the first row of Table 6 
that the course of wage development for workers whose establishments left a sectoral 
agreement is nevertheless comparatively more favorable than is the case where workers are in 
an establishment never covered by any type of agreement. Relative to the latter group, there is 
indeed an average gain of 1.0 percent in favor of the former.  
The results in the second row of the table are more mixed, with the estimated effect for 
2008-2010 indicating that whenever an establishment switches from a sectoral agreement to a 
firm-level agreement, worker wages go up at higher rate than the wages of those workers in 
establishments always covered by a firm agreement. This seems consistent with the evidence in 
Table 4 of a positive gap favorable to sectoral agreements relative to firm agreements. The 
condition for this interpretation is the assumption that sectoral agreements have a long-lasting 
effect on wage developments, one that cannot be totally offset even after two years. 
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The results for sectoral agreement joiners in the third row follow the same script: 
whenever an establishment joins a sectoral agreement, wages presumably go up (based again 
on the evidence provided in Table 5) but by less than would have occurred had the workers 
been in an establishment that remained consistently covered by a sectoral agreement over the 
corresponding sample period. Indeed, the loss amounts to 1.1 percent, on average.9 In turn, the 
results in the fifth row suggest that firm agreements have some long-lasting effects, too, as 
workers in establishments leaving firm agreements continue to receive higher wage increases 
than their counterparts in never covered plants.  For its part, the evidence from the sixth row is 
more mixed, with a positive effect in the first sub-period and a negative effect in the second. 
Next, turning to the aggregate category (i.e. coverage under any type of collective 
agreement), the seventh row shows that although the evidence from Table 5 would lead us to 
expect a fall in wages after an establishment leaves a collective agreement of either type, it 
remains the case that the wage change will still be comparatively more favorable than that 
obtained by workers in establishments never covered by a collective agreement. Indeed, an 
average wage gain of 0.9 percent is anticipated as compared with the negative average value of 
-0.6 percent recorded in Table 5.  
Conversely, while workers in an establishment joining a collective agreement are 
expected to have, say, a 1 percent increase in their wage over a period of two years relatively to 
those in an establishment never covered by any form of collective agreement (see the last row 
                                                          
9
 The results in the fourth row of the table suggest that joining a sectoral agreement from an initial state of having a 
firm agreement is more favorable to wage development than being always covered by a sectoral agreement. This 
finding contradicts the estimates in the fourth row of Table 5. The probable reason is sample size which is quite 
different in the two experiments, likely invalidating the comparison. 
 
18 
 
of Table 5), the corresponding results with the different counterfactual in the last row of the 
Table 6 offer a more qualified story. They show that the wage increase for joining plants is 
comparatively smaller than the wage increases received by workers in those always covered 
establishments. If anything, there is an increasing gap in this regard, amounting to some -1.3 
percent by the end of our sample period in 2008-2010. 
 
6. Conclusions 
That over the last two decades German collective bargaining coverage has declined, and that 
the trend persists, is beyond dispute. Much less clear-cut, however, is the impact of this decline 
on wage development. Indeed, the literature lacks a critical value: an updated estimate of the 
union/collective bargaining premium. This lacuna provided the motivation for the present 
treatment.  
Whatever the reasons behind the erosion of collective bargaining coverage, there is 
little reason to anticipate an elevated union wage gap, since unions should have become 
weaker rather than stronger (independent support for which proposition is provided by Hirsch 
and Schnabel, 2011). As a matter of fact, joining any type of agreement from a position of non-
coverage has proven decreasingly favorable to wages, while the reverse transition has become 
decreasingly unfavorable. On the other hand, and looking at the two types of collective 
agreements separately, leaving sectoral agreements to non-coverage does involve losses (albeit 
decreasing), while joining a sectoral agreement from non-coverage entails wage gains at a 
slightly increasing rate. The concatenation of these results obviously implies that workers in 
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establishments that have switched to firm agreements from non-coverage are gradually losing 
the wage advantage.  
Even if the results of this article are not directly comparable with those of previous 
studies because of differences in methodology, they are consistent with the findings of studies 
seeking to tackle the causality issue in that the collective bargaining premium is smaller than 
more conventional estimates. More importantly of course, and unlike previous studies, the 
present treatment is able to chart movements in the collective bargaining premium over the 
course of the first decade of the 2000s. And in terms of broad movements into and out of 
collective bargaining, these changes are in the main consistent with the decline in union 
influence implied by diminishing coverage over that interval.  
That being said, the transitions between firm and sectoral collective agreements do not 
seem to offer any clear-cut conclusions, with indications that establishments switching from 
firm to sectoral agreements tend increasingly to register wage gains, while at the same time 
switching from sectoral to firm agreements seems also to be increasingly beneficial. This 
apparent contradiction seems to be due to the lack of comparability in the selected estimation 
samples, which is not altogether surprising given the non-experimental nature of our exercise. 
More interesting are the results generated by the reverse counterfactuals. Here, the 
most important finding is that although we generally expect workers to have higher wages after 
their establishments join a collective agreement, and lower wages after leaving, the 
gains/losses tend to be smaller (in absolute terms) if one compares the treated group (i.e. 
joiners or leavers) with the initially selected groups of never members or always members, 
rather than with always members and never members, respectively. As regards the leavers this 
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finding confirms the presence of some persistence in the effects of collective bargaining 
coverage. Against this backdrop, we distinctly prefer our two-year estimates to any others 
based on a shorter interval.  
In sum, notwithstanding asymmetry and sensitivity to particular control groups, the 
evidence reported in this article supports the idea that the coverage premium is modest and 
has been subject to modest changes. As a matter of fact, in none of the experiments carried out 
in this study is the coverage premium outside the -1.5/+2.4 percent range. Given this rather 
narrow margin in the light of the variety of treatment and control groups, it also seems to us 
unlikely that issues related to the endogeneity of collective agreement decisions are playing a 
decisive role in our results. 
This does not mean that a search for idiosyncratic factors might not prove useful. A case 
in point might be a change in management ethos. This is one intriguing research area for the 
future. Another is the much broader theme of whether the distinct decentralization that we can 
observe within sectoral collective bargaining has had a chilling effect on exits at the same time 
as the contract premium has declined. 
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Table 1 
Longitudinal Pattern of Observed Workers 
 
2000-2002 
Year of observation  
Number of workers 
 
Number of establishments 2000 2001 2002 
Yes Yes Yes 721,321 6,279 
Yes  Yes No 327,829 6,687 
Yes No Yes 48,503 4,210 
Yes No No 549,528 9,192 
No Yes Yes 127,890 5,207 
No Yes No 142,360 5,972 
No No Yes 491,841 7,236 
 Total=2,409,272   
 
2008-2010 
2008 2009 2010   
Yes Yes Yes 627,027 6,858 
Yes Yes No 260,129 6,649 
Yes No Yes 77,968 3,901 
Yes No No 461,133 9,060 
No Yes Yes 98,996 5,563 
No Yes No 93,982 5,715 
No No Yes 288,995 7,652 
 Total=1,908,231  
Note:  A given worker necessarily populates one of the seven distinct patterns, but their establishments 
are not necessarily distinct. 
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Table 2 
Longitudinal Pattern of Workers Observed at Least Twice Over the Observation Window 
 
Workers with three consecutive observations 
 
Profile 
Year  
Number of workers 
 
Number of  establishments 2000 2001 2002 
1 A A A 716,844 5,222 
2 A A B 2,168 1,441 
3 A B B 2,283 1,680 
4 A B C 26 68 
 2008 2009 2010    
1 A A A 623,732 6,081 
2 A A B 1,524 1,122 
3 A B B 1,754 1,291 
4 A B C 17 51 
Workers with two consecutive observations 
 2000 2001 2002   
5 A A  325,473 6,176 
6 A B  2,356 1,735 
7  A A 126,439 4,754 
8  A B 1,451 1,207 
 2008 2009 2010   
5 A A  258,710 6,282 
6 A B  1,418 1,134 
7  A A 98,133 5,233 
8  A B 863 826 
Workers with two non-consecutive observations 
 2000 2001 2002   
9 A  A 43,142 2,672 
10 A  B 3,695 1,869 
 2008 2009 2010   
9 A  A 74,832 2,799 
10 A  B 2,092 1,202 
Note: A, B, and C are establishment identifiers. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Two- and One-Year Establishment Collective Bargaining Transitions 
 
 
One-year transitions 
  t+1=2001 
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t=2000 Anycb=0 Anycb=1 Total 
Anycb=0 2,351 441 2,792 
Anycb=1 424 3,215 3,639 
Total 2,775 3,656 6,431 
 
 t+1=2002 
t=2001 Anycb=0 Anycb=1 Total 
Anycb=0 2,046 270 2,316 
Anycb=1 405 2,548 2,953 
Total 2,451 2,818 5,269 
 
 t+1=2009 
t=2008 Anycb=0 Anycb=1 Total 
Anycb=0 3,385 412 3,798 
Anycb=1 413 2,931 3,343 
Total 3,798 3,343 7,141 
 
 t+1=2010 
t=2009 Anycb=0 Anycb=1 Total 
Anycb=0 3,340 106 3,446 
Anycb=1 323 2555 2,878 
Total 3,663 2,661 6,324 
 
Two-year transitions 
 t+2=2002 
t=2000 Anycb=0 Anycb=1 Total 
Anycb=0 1,829 301 2,130 
Anycb=1 422 2,415 2,837 
Total  2,251 2,716 4,967 
 
 t+2=2010 
t=2008 Anycb=0 Anycb=1 Total 
Anycb=0 2,776 223 2,999 
Anycb=1 378 2,280 2,658 
Total 3,154 2,503 5,657 
             Note: Anycb denotes the presence, or otherwise, of any collective bargaining – either  
             sectoral or firm-level bargaining.   
 
 
Table 4 
OLS Wage Regressions, Summary Results 
  
  Collective bargaining argument 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if Dummy variable equal to 1 if Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
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worker is in an establishment 
covered by a sectoral 
agreement; 0 if the 
establishment is not covered by 
any type of agreement 
worker is in an establishment 
covered by a sectoral agreement; 
0 if the establishment is covered 
by a firm-level agreement 
worker is in an establishment 
covered by any type of collective 
agreement; 0 otherwise 
2000-2002 
 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 
𝛿 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.070*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.064*** 0.069*** 0.063*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
N 769,989 593,733 637,147 756,738 596,214 688,990 867,881 680,348 787,919 
2008-2010 
 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 
𝛿 0.091***
 
0.115*** 0.140*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.081*** 0.102*** 0.125*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
N 656,425 485,264 467,885 677,988 472,299 427,984 818,831 587,493 540,864 
Notes: For each cross-section the fitted model is given by 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑍𝑖𝛽 + 𝛿𝑈𝑗 + 𝜔𝑖 [see model (1) in the 
text].  Standard errors are given in parenthesis. 
*** denotes statistical significance at the .01 level. 
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 Table 5 
Estimates of the Collective Bargaining Premium, Two-Year Differences (2000-2002 and 2008-
2010), Job Stayers 
 
Sample Period: 2000-2002 Period: 2008-2010 
 
Experiment 
 
Treatment and 
control groups 
Collective 
bargaining status 
in 
 
𝛿 
 
N 
 
𝛿 
 
N 
t-2 t 
 
 
Scb leavers 
vs. 
Scb stayers 
 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Scb=1 
 
Anycb=0 
 
-0.007*** 
(0.0017) 
 
375,397 
 
-0.004** 
(0.0018) 
 
289,320 
Control group (stayers) Scb=1 Scb=1 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Scb=1 
 
Fcb=1 
 
-0.004** 
(0.0014) 
 
378,843 
 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
 
295,414 
Control group (stayers) Scb=1 Scb=1 
 
 
Scb joiners 
vs. 
Scb never members 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Anycb=0 
 
Scb=1 
 
0.007*** 
(0.0017) 
 
46,000 
 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
 
66,228 
Control group 
(never members) 
Anycb=0 
 
Anycb=0 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Fcb=1 
 
Scb=1 
 
0.010*** 
(0.0019) 
 
57,847 
 
0.023*** 
(0.002) 
 
86,543 
Control group  
(never members) 
Fcb=1 Fcb=1 
 
Fcb leavers 
vs. 
Fcb stayers 
 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Fcb=1 
 
Anycb=0 
 
-0.009*** 
(0.0024) 
 
54,849 
 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
 
83,443 
Control group (stayers) Fcb=1 Fcb=1 
 
Fcb joiners 
vs. 
Fcb never members 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Anycb=0 
 
Fcb=1 
 
0.024*** 
(0.0019) 
 
44,297 
 
0.002 
(0.002) 
 
64,992 
Control group  
(never members) 
Anycb=0 
 
Anycb=0 
 
 
Anycb leavers 
vs. 
Anycb stayers 
 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Anycb=1 
 
Anycb=0 
 
-0.009*** 
(0.0013) 
 
447,074 
 
-0.003** 
(0.002) 
 
393,165 
Control group (stayers) Anycb=1 Anycb=1 
 
Anycb joiners 
vs. 
Anycb  never 
members 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Anycb=0 
 
Anycb=1 
 
0.014*** 
(0.0013) 
 
50,956 
 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
 
69,194 
Control group 
(never members) 
Anycb=0 
 
Anycb=0 
 
Notes: The fitted model is given model (3) in the text.  Anycb is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a worker 
is in an establishment covered by any type of collective agreement, 0 otherwise; Scb (Fcb) is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a worker is in an establishment covered by a sectoral (firm) agreement, 0 
otherwise.  Standard errors are given in parenthesis. 
***,**,* denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Estimates of the Collective Bargaining Premium, Two-Year Differences (2000-2002 and 2008-
2010) but with Different Counterfactuals, Job Stayers 
 
Sample Period: 2000-2002 Period: 2008-2010 
 
Experiment 
 
Treatment and 
control groups 
Collective 
bargaining status 
in 
 
𝛿 
 
N 
 
𝛿 
 
N 
t-2 t 
 
 
Scb leavers 
vs. 
Scb never members 
 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Scb=1 
 
Anycb=0 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
46,317 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
69,656 
Control group 
 (never members) 
Anycb=0 Anycb=0 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Scb=1 
 
Fcb=1 -0.001 
(0.001) 
61,863 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
93,589 
Control group 
 (never members) 
Fcb=1 Fcb=1 
 
 
Scb joiners 
vs. 
Scb always members 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Anycb=0 
 
Scb=1 -0.009*** 
(0.002) 
375,080 
-0.013*** 
(0.002) 
285,892 
Control group 
(always members) 
Scb=1 
 
Scb=1 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Fcb=1 
 
Scb=1 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
374,827 
0.021*** 
(0.002) 
288,368 
Control group  
(always members) 
Scb=1 Scb=1 
 
Fcb leavers 
vs. 
Anycb never members 
 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Fcb=1 
 
Anycb=0  0.004* 
(0.002) 
42,749 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
65,604 Control group 
 (never members) 
Anycb=0 Anycb=0 
 
Fcb joiners 
 vs. 
Fcb always members 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Anycb=0 
 
Fcb=1 0.014*** 
(0.002) 
56,397 
-0.015*** 
(0.003) 
82,830 Control group 
( always members) 
Fcb=1 
 
Fcb=1 
 
 
Anycb leavers 
vs. 
Anycb never members 
 
 
Treated group (leavers) 
 
Anycb=1 
 
Anycb=0 0.007*** 
(0.001) 
49,725 
0.010*** 
(0.001) 
73,234 Control group  
(never members) 
Anycb=0 Anycb=0 
 
Anycb joiner 
 vs. 
Anycb always members 
 
 
Treated group (joiners) 
 
Anycb=0 
 
Anycb=1 -0.002 
(0.001) 
448,305 
-0.013*** 
(0.002) 
389,124 Control group 
(always members) 
Anycb=1 
 
Anycb=1 
 
Note: See notes to Table 5. 
 
